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Abstract 
This article critically assesses the increasingly prevalent claims of rapidly changing global power relations under 
influence of the ‘rising powers’ and ‘globalization.’ Our main contention is that current analyses of countries’ 
degree of global power (especially for the BRICS) has been dominated by the control over resources approach that, 
although it gauges power potential, it insufficiently accounts for how this potential is converted into actual global 
might. By drawing on a unique and extensive dataset comprised of a wide array of political, economic, and military 
networks for a vast number of countries between 1965 and 2005, we aim to 1) reassess alleged changes in the 
structure of the world-system since 1965 and 2) analyze whether or not these changes can be attributed to 
globalization. We pay attention to the trajectories of the BRICS and to the possibly divergent structural evolutions 
of the political and economic dimensions that constitute the system. Our results show that despite a certain degree 
of power convergence between countries at the sub-top of the system, divergence continues to take place between 
the most and least powerful, and stratification is reproduced. Globalization is further shown to exacerbate this 
trend, though its effect differs on the political and economic dimensions of the system. Though the traditional ‘core 
powers’ might have to share their power with newcomer China in the future, this hardly heralds a new age in which 
the global system of power relations are converging to the extent that stratification is being undermined.  
Keywords: Sociology; Political Science; Global Studies; International Relations 
 
 
 Journal of World-System Research   |   Vol. 22   Issue 2  |   The Rising Powers 
 
jwsr.org   |   DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2016.624 
374 
 
Recent developments have created the impression that the global power structure is shifting; new 
countries appear to be rising to prominence in the global system, while the traditional powers are 
stagnating or even declining. The economic and social transformations in the traditionally 
dominant Western powers, combined with the rise of the BRICS countries, including the 
spectacular rise of China, suggest that the era in which Western nations dominated the global 
system may be coming to an end, and that in the near future these countries may have to share 
power with these new rising powers (e.g., Cooper and Flemes, 2013; Layne, 2009). Globalization 
is often identified as the primary cause of this alleged structural change (Friedman, 2005; Zakaria, 
2008). 
Globalization is employed here to denote a transformative process in which countries become 
more integrated and interdependent in the economic as well as political, social, and cultural 
subsystems. This process is said to cause countries to increasingly lose autonomy, to become more 
affected by domestic affairs in other countries, and to be more dependent on their relations with 
other countries. Scholarly communities and popular opinion contend that global power relations 
have changed irrevocably under influence of the globalization process and the subsequent rise of 
a number of non-traditional powers (e.g., Cooper and Flemes, 2013; Friedman, 2005; Zakaria, 
2008). Other authorss, by contrast, maintain that this dominant perception insufficiently focuses 
on long-term stratification, the reproduction of hierarchy in global power relations, and the 
emergence of new inequalities (Cooper and Mo, 2013). World-systems scholars have found 
evidence confirming that, contrary to neo-liberal predictions, the processes associated with 
globalization reproduce existing inequalities in the world-system (e.g., Arrighi et al., 2003, 
Mahutga, 2006). Against the wide-spread allegations of large-scale change, the counterargument 
holds that globalization does not fundamentally challenge inequalities and in fact, may exacerbate 
them. 
The BRICS countries are often seen as the prototypes of the new rising powers in the global 
system. The acronym refers to a set of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and (sometimes) 
South Africa) that all show a promise of rapid economic growth (Cooper, 2006; Cheng et al., 2007; 
Desai, 2007; Hancock, 2007), and that potentially may become important players in the global 
system. However, critics have already pointed to the enormous diversity amongst these five 
countries, not only regarding their current situation and history, but also with respect to their past 
economic growth rates and future prospects (Desai, 2007; Glosny, 2010; Armijo, 2007; Jacobs & 
Van Rossem, 2014). Economically, Armijo (2007) argues that what these countries share is 
economic size, not their economic growth, nor the opportunities for investments. This contention 
aside, these countries have all been regional powers for a while; Russia and China are global 
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superpowers, and all are quite active on the international scene. The potential of the BRICS 
countries is not exclusively economic but military and political as well. 
The official statistics confirm that the economic trajectories of the BRICS countries vary 
widely. From the mid-20th century onwards, Brazil and India followed an import substitution 
industrialization strategy and have only recently become more free-trade oriented, while China 
had its initial industrialization following a communist economic strategy based on self-reliance. 
The Chinese economy only started liberalizing somewhat from the 1980s onwards when it started 
to pursue an export-led strategy. The Russian Federation also inherited an industrialized 
communist economy which shrank substantially in the early 1990s, experienced a dubious 
liberalization, and is now heavily dependent on the export of raw materials. Since 2000, all of the 
BRICS countries have experienced a higher average economic growth than the world as a whole. 
Where the world economy grew on an average of 2.7% each year over the period 2000-2014 
(World Bank, 2016 & our calculations), China’s economy grew by 9.7% and India’s by 7.0% on 
average per year over this period. The three remaining BRICS countries, however, experienced 
less stellar growth rates over this period; Russia: 4.5%, Brazil: 3.3% and South-Africa: 3.2%. The 
BRICS countries’ growing shares of world trade also show that their economies have become 
increasingly important in the global economy. In 2000, the 5 BRICS countries accounted for 6.34% 
of the total global exports in goods and services, and this increased to 16.48% by 2014. However, 
there are substantial differences among the BRICS, with China responsible for most of this gain. 
In 2000, China’s exports accounted for 2.74% of total global trade, and by 2014 this had grown to 
10.46%. By contrast, Brazil (from 0.87% to 1.12%) and South Africa (from 0.47% to 0.46%) saw 
their share of the global trade increase very little or not at all. The volume of trade does not 
determine the power a country derives from it, however, as trade flows may be sources of both 
power and dependency. Whether or not trade relations are a source of power or dependency, and 
to what extent, depends on the structure of a country’s trade relations and how they are embedded 
in the global trade network. 
The military potential of the BRICS also varies substantially. Russia, and to a lesser degree, 
China and India are nuclear weapons nations, while the other two BRICS countries are not. Russia 
is a former superpower that saw its military power decline substantially in the wake of the collapse 
of the USSR. Recently, however, Russia has started to rebuild its forces and has adopted a more 
assertive military strategy, not only towards NATO and neighboring countries, but also by 
involvement in international conflicts. Both its nuclear and conventional military capabilities 
remain strong (Xuetong, 2006; Hart & Jones, 2010). China’s military power remains considerably 
weaker than Russia’s, but the country has embarked on a process to modernize its forces (Sutter, 
2003). Recently, China has become more assertive, establishing itself as a power in Asia and 
challenging both its neighbors and the USA (Holslag, 2015). India is a regional rather than a global 
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power (Sinha & Dorschner, 2010), and remains weak compared to the global military powers. 
Neither Brazil nor South Africa play any meaningful global military role. In 2011, China and 
Russia were placed 2nd and 3rd, respectively, in a ranking of 129 countries’ military expenditures, 
accounting for 7.96% and 3.95% of worldwide military expenditures (SIPRI, 2012 & our 
calculations). The other BRICS countries also spend a lot on their militaries: India was ranked 8th 
(2.73%), Brazil was ranked 11th (1.94%) and South Africa was ranked 35th (0.30%). Note that the 
combined military expenditures of the BRICS are still dwarfed by those of the number 1 spender, 
the USA, which in 2011 accounted for 43.45% for global military expenditures. The BRICS are 
no match for the USA in terms of military expenditure. However, expenditures do not say it all. 
India and Brazil, for instance, may receive much less returns in terms of global military power 
than countries that spend far less, as they make little use of their military to project their power 
globally. 
The BRICS’ political power can be traced through the role played by these countries in 
international affairs. Both Russia and China are members of the UN Security Council, but they 
remained politically isolated for a long time because of their communist regimes. They only 
became more active on the international political scene after the collapse of the USSR and China’s 
economic opening up to the world. Brazil and India, by contrast, have been politically prominent 
on the global scene, and stress their non-aligned position as advocates for the low- and middle-
income countries. South Africa was politically isolated until the fall of the apartheid regime and 
after this started to play a more visible role on the international scene. All BRICS countries focus 
on international organizations to exert political influence. Brazil and India have been well-
integrated since the mid-20th century, but Russia, China, and South Africa have only sought access 
to international organizations since the 1990s. All of them aim to mobilize regional blocs and 
developing nations to influence decision-making in these international organizations (Hart & 
Jones, 2010). Russia further attempts to restore its influence over the former Soviet states, while 
China attempts to assert its position in Asia and to establish ties with many African nations. 
The available evidence confirms that the BRICS are a quite diverse lot. Economically, their 
performance and power varies widely, and they also differ substantially in military strength. They 
currently seem to follow similar strategies regarding their political power in the global system, 
although the economically and militarily stronger BRICS, Russia and China, also pursue more 
assertive strategies to gain political influence. However, these indicators are all based upon the 
possession of resources. This is especially the case for economic and military power. Although 
resources certainly can be sources of power, power also depends on how these resources are used. 
Systemic power is fundamentally a relational process, in which resources are used to create 
dependencies. The network approach to power and prominence stresses not only the relational 
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aspect of power but also the fact that each power relation is embedded in a structure of power 
relations. 
Therefore, this paper examines whether and how globalization has affected the global power 
structure between 1965 and 2005. We question whether or not globalization impacts hierarchy and 
inequality in the global power structure, and what its impact is on mobility in this system. To weigh 
in on the above debate about the rising powers and the BRICS, we also aim to identity exactly 
which countries have benefited from globalization in terms of rising to power. 
 
Prominence in the Global System 
Nobody will deny that the US is a more powerful country than Grenada, or that China is more 
powerful than Nepal. The structure of the hierarchical global power system reflects power 
differences among countries. This is the underlying idea behind the network studies of the world-
system (Clark, 2010; Clark and Beckfield, 2009; Clark and Mahutga, 2013; Kick and Davis, 2001; 
Kick, McKinney, McDonald, and Jorgenson, 2011; Lloyd et al., 2009; Mahutga, 2006; Mahutga 
and Smith, 2011; Nemeth and Smith, 1985; Smith and White, 1992; Snyder and Kick, 1979; Van 
Rossem, 1996) that assume that more prominent countries are at an advantage compared to those 
that are less prominent or in the periphery.  
Network studies conceptualize the world-system in a way that is quite unique and that differs 
from world-system analysis in some respects (e.g., Clark 2008; 2010; Clark and Beckfield 2009; 
Lloyd et al. 2009). Where world-systems analysis focuses on the type of production process in 
defining countries’ position in the IDL and the world-system, SNA defines power and dependency 
by the patterns of power/dependency relations between countries, thus by partner dependency 
(Clark 2008; 2010). Notwithstanding these differences, Galtung’s (1971) conceptualization of the 
“feudal interaction structure” (FIS) of the world-system illustrates how both are often strongly 
interrelated. The FIS is characterized by asymmetric and exclusive dependency relations between 
core and peripheral countries, symmetric and non-exclusive dependency relations among core 
countries, and the absence of relations among peripheral countries. This is also consistent with the 
idea that the power of A over B is relational in nature and stems from dependency of B on A, 
Emerson’s (1962) arguments, and with arguments from organizational and open systems theory. 
These latter arguments are based on the contention that dependency stems from the ability of the 
other to create fluctuations which will have major effects on the functioning of the actor (Scott, 
1992). 
Inspired by Galtung’s (1971) FIS, network analysis has proved to be a valuable tool in the 
study of the structure of the world-system. Due to the aforementioned differences, however, we 
refer here to the global system of power relations rather than to the world-system to denote the 
global network of dependency relations among countries.  
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The relationship between network prominence and power remains complex. It reflects power 
in the sense that it captures how power resources are converted into more stable (inter)dependency 
relations and thus create a global power structure. The position within this network can create 
advantages for countries. Following the FIS, for instance, core countries monopolize the flows of 
resources and information among peripheral countries, as the latter lack direct relations with each 
other. Such a brokerage position provides advantages (see Burt 1992). A diverse network of 
trading partners also limits vulnerability to the disruption of one or more of these relations. By 
strategically developing these dependency relationships, countries can punch above their weight 
in the global system. For instance, lesser developed countries (LDCs) have actively developed 
alliances and memberships to international organizations (IGOs) to improve their influence in the 
global system. Network prominence, therefore, reflects power as well as opportunities, visibility, 
and influence, and is the result of a country’s resources and strategic action.  
Following the (network) research tradition set forth by Snyder and Kick (1979), Kick and 
Davis (2001), and Van Rossem (1996), we include economic as well as military and political 
relations. Other world-system scholars have similarly pointed towards the need for more research 
into a multidimensional conceptualization of the world-system (e.g., Chase-Dunn, 1998; Kentor, 
2000). Babones (2005) and Clark and Beckfield (2009) acknowledge that non-economic networks 
could be relevant in predicting a variety of (more non-economic) outcomes in the world-system. 
Thus, some states will rely more on economic power for global status or prominence, while others 
rely more on political and/or military power. It follows that a country’s degree of power in the 
“global arena” can flow forth from its combined position on these various power networks, and 
countries’ positions on these networks can vary substantially. These power networks must then be 
relatively autonomous and follow their own logic to a certain extent, though this does not imply 
that they are completely independent.  
 
Globalization and the Global System 
Globalization is a catch-all term referring to a complex of interrelated transformations that affect 
practically the entire world and most of its population. Structurally, it refers to the increased flows 
and (inter)dependencies among countries and regions. These flows include people, trade, capital, 
information, communication, rules and regulation, etc. This implies that the networks connecting 
the countries become denser, stronger, and more multiplex as countries become connected in 
multiple ways. As part of the globalization process, countries become more integrated in the global 
system and more interdependent. 
However, the question remains as to how this affects the structure of the global system. An 
often heard argument holds that globalization, or political and economic integration into the 
system, both directly and indirectly benefits countries’ global economic and political positions, 
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and thus undermines stratification in the system (e.g., Friedman, 2005; Zakaria, 2008). By contrast, 
a considerable number of scholars, especially world-systems scholars, contest the above 
perspective that globalization undermines the stratified nature of the global system, and argue that 
it might in fact even reinforce systemic inequality (e.g., Arrighi et al., 2003; Clark and Beckfield, 
2009; Mahutga, 2006; Wallerstein, 1974).  
The dominant argument stemming from neo-liberal economics holds that growing 
interdependence through political and economic integration underpins development opportunities 
and economic growth (e.g., Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Dreher, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2002), whether 
it is because of greater trade openness (Frankel and Romer, 1999), economic liberalization (Collins 
and Bosworth, 1996; Sachs and Warner, 1997), or increased financial flows. The emergence of the 
new international division of labor (NIDL) (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye, 1980) and the expansion 
of neoliberal trade policy since the 1980s is especially believed to benefit developing countries. 
The relocation of production processes to developing countries, their ensuing industrialization, and 
inflow of foreign direct investments is expected to boost their domestic economies and facilitate 
integration into the global economy (e.g., Amsden, 2001).  
Overall, globalization is said to decrease global income inequality (Firebaugh, 2003) and 
undermine the power hierarchy (e.g., Norberg, 2003) and centralization (Kim and Shin, 2002) in 
the world-system, ultimately “flattening out” the world (Friedman, 2005). Finally, scholars from 
the world polity tradition argue that integration of non-core countries into the world polity is 
causing stratification and core dominance in global political networks to decline (Beckfield, 2003, 
2008; Boli, Loya, and Loftin, 1999; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997). The evidence here 
points towards a declining inequality in the world polity, at least regarding state intergovernmental 
organization (IGO) membership (Beckfield, 2003, 2008) and preferential trade agreements 
(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2009). 
The world-systems paradigm argues that the mechanisms inherent in the logic of the 
capitalist world-system reproduce the global hierarchy. The core’s ability to constantly shift to 
new and more innovative production processes that create more surplus value ensures core 
dominance. As the profitability of core-like processes decreases, these processes are relocated to 
the semiperiphery. Though this shift may underlie upward mobility for certain countries, especially 
in the semiperiphery, benefits do not accrue equally to all countries in the world-system. This 
process does not undercut hierarchy but sustains old forms of structural inequality. Wallerstein 
(2000, 2005) contends that what appears to be sudden, globalization-induced change, in fact 
reflects a combination of long term cyclical rhythms and secular trends inherent to the systemic 
mechanisms that underlie the workings of the world-system.  
Arrighi et al. (2003), Mahutga (2006), and Mahutga and Smith (2011) focus on countries’ 
production processes to study the impact of globalization on structural inequality and economic 
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growth in the world-system. Arrighi et al. (2003) find that the mechanisms of both structural and 
ideological globalization (of the 1980s and 1990s) underlie the reproduction of the North-South 
income divide. Mahutga’s (2006) analysis of commodity trade networks show that the core and a 
few semiperipheral countries benefitted disproportionally from the restructuring that began in the 
1960s. These findings are compatible with other networks research on the world-system that find 
especially strong upward mobility of the middle tier states over those in the periphery (Clark, 2010; 
Mahutga & Smith, 2011). Indeed, most of the countries in the periphery or LDC’s often lack the 
resources to exploit the globalization process to their own benefit.  
Thus, to capitalize on globalization, countries do not only require the necessary infrastructure 
and resources, a stable political system, and a sufficiently well-educated population, but must 
also be integrated in the global system to a certain degree. Though all four BRIC economies have 
opened up to the global economy since the second half of the 20th century, the speed and degree 
to which they did varied significantly, as these four countries obviously possess very different 
material and relational resources. Both China’s and Russia’s communist systems largely isolated 
them from the international economy before the fall of the Soviet Union and the Chinese market 
reforms of 1978. The latter reforms were designed to achieve economic modernization through the 
gradual opening up to the global market economy (Geis & Holt, 2009). Underpinned by its 
enormous population size, China followed an export-oriented strategy to economic integration 
through large-scale industrialization and significant trade liberalization.  
Though investment and consumer-driven demand are becoming increasingly important in 
Russia, the Russian economy is fueled by natural resources, including oil, natural gas, metals, and 
timber, which account for more than 80% of exports. This dependency on commodity exports and 
insufficient economic diversity leaves the country “vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices” 
(Cheng et al., 2007: 146). As Brazil and India are less industrialized than China, they rely much 
less on mass export as a means of domestic economic development and global economic 
integration. This translates into a significantly smaller share of the global economy and partially 
results from deliberate economic policy. Tough Russia and China are permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, and their communist regimes restrained them to far more isolated, 
disadvantaged positions in terms of political power in the global system than was the case for 
Brazil and India as far back as 1965. Despite these differing starting points, all four countries 
followed similar strategies towards global political integration. These strategies include a 
combination of regional and south-south cooperation and cooperation within the BRICs to form 
political blocs within multilateral institutions and to promote opportunities for developing nations. 
We should not underestimate the political contradictions within these four countries, however, 
both in terms of competition for power on the world stage and in terms of their very divergent 
domestic political systems.   
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World-systems scholars do not deny the possibility of upward mobility, but this observed 
mobility is not seen to alter the inequalities in the system in any fundamental way. In fact, it is 
argued to even reinforce these inequalities and divides. Although some less prominent countries 
may benefit, the more prominent countries tend to benefit the most, reinforcing their dominance 
over the system.  
In sum, the dominant focus on massive and large scale change and short term fluctuations 
(especially since the 1990s), has led the majority of scholarly research to disregard long-term 
continuity and stratification in the world-system; i.e. the persisting restraints experienced by the 
non-traditional powers and the reproduction of the structural hierarchy in the system. Although 
globalization may increase the density, strength, and multiplexity of the dependency relations 
among countries, it does not fundamentally challenge the dominance of the most prominent 
countries nor the FIS. Following the conflicting perspectives outlined above, this paper sets out to 
test the hypothesis that globalization reduced structural inequality in the global system between 
1965 and 2005 by increasing the mobility of less prominent countries. The evolution experienced 
by the BRICS countries over this period is emphasized. 
 
Measuring Global System Prominence 
Network analysis has been frequently used to operationalize the structure of and inequalities within 
the world-system. Most of these studies rely on blockmodel techniques that recover discrete strata 
with the global system (e.g., Nemeth and Smith, 1985; Smith and White, 1992; Snyder and Kick, 
1979). More recently, several studies have started to use continuous measures of prominence, 
power, or centrality (e.g., Lloyd et al., 2009; Mahutga, 2006). For this paper we employ such a 
continuous prominence measure calculated on a series of dichotomous networks that capture 
economic, political, and military dependency relations among countries1. Each network tie 
represents a dependency relation between two countries. A tie from country B to country A implies 
B is dependent on A and that A, therefore, has some power over B. The rationale for these choices 
was taken from Van Rossem (1996). Dependent and overseas territories and colonies were 
considered dependent on their mother country for diplomatic relations, international alliances, and 
the presence of foreign troops. This method requires all network relations to be dichotomous. 
Economic relations were operationalized using import and export dependency. Country B is 
considered import or export dependent on country A when the respective flow exceeds one percent 
of B’s GDP. The rationale is that 1) the importance of a trade flow depends on the overall size of 
a country’s economy, and 2) the trade flow must be substantial for it to constitute a dependency 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Social network analysis often still assumes that relationships are dichotomous, either two nodes have a relationship, 
or they do not. All standard prominence, centrality, or power measures assume that the network is dichotomous and 
are based on the structure of present and absent ties among nodes. The prominence measure used here is no exception. 
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relation. For instance, Panama will be much more dependent on a country it exports one million 
dollars of goods to than the USA will be for the same amount. The data is based on both the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF, 2010a) and the Correlates of War “International Trade” dataset 
(Barbieri and Keshk, 2012). We obtained GDP data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2011). Missing data was supplemented from the United Nation’s 
Statistical Yearbook (United Nations, 2010) and from the IMF’s Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010b). 
We imputed missing export flows from the corresponding import flow, and vice versa. As is the 
case with all official economic statistics, this data also underestimates both countries’ real GDP 
and the real trade flows among countries. This is because the undocumented (illegal and informal) 
economy is not counted. Although all countries are vulnerable to such underestimation, one can 
expect this to be more pronounced in lower income countries. On the other hand, that the data 
collection is quite standardized is what makes the data quite comparable over countries and time. 
For political relations, we included data on (1) diplomatic representation and (2) joint 
memberships of intergovernmental organizations. Diplomatic representation refers to the presence 
of an embassy of one country in another (Europa Publications, 2011). Many countries lack the 
resources to establish embassies in all countries with which they have diplomatic relations and will 
restrict themselves to establishing representation in countries that are politically most important to 
them. Joint membership of intergovernmental organizations was operationalized as the number of 
joint IGO memberships of two countries divided by the number of IGO memberships of the 
sending country (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 2004). Countries with many joint IGO 
memberships are considered important by their partner countries not only due to their ability to 
exert a strong influence on global policy making, but also because they constitute important 
partners on the global political scene. As both IGO memberships and the presence of embassies 
are both quite public events, the quality of this data is excellent. 
Military relations include (1) formal alliances, (2) the presence of foreign troops, and (3) 
trade in major weapon systems. The alliance data was obtained from the Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) (Leeds, Ritter, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Long, 
2002), and the International Military Alliances Encyclopedia, 1648-2008 (Gibler, 2009). As with 
diplomatic relations, countries form alliances with others that are politically and strategically 
important to them. Though the presence of foreign troops in a country can either be hostile or 
peaceful and strategic, both instances represent dependency relations. The source of this data was 
the military balance (IISS, 1965 – 2005). Presence of troops as part of a United Nations 
peacekeeping force was excluded. Trade in major weapons systems refers to long term military 
relations between nations, as delivery of such systems often takes several years and usually 
requires government involvement and approval on both sides. Here, the country receiving arms 
was considered dependent on alter for weapons systems and thus for military support. The 
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information was collected from the yearly reports by the SIPRI (SIPRI, 1965-2005). To the extent 
that weapon deals, treaties, and the presence of troops are kept secret, these indicators will 
underestimate the military relations among countries.  
 
Prominence Measures 
To operationalize global system prominence, we created a measure that would capture Galtung’s 
FIS (1971). Hummel and Sodeur’s (1987; see also Burt 1990) triad census method, which was 
originally developed to measure role equivalence, proved a useful starting point. Although 
originally used to estimate blockmodels of the world system structure (Van Rossem, 1996), the 
triad censuses can also be used to calculate prominence indicators. Triads are the smallest part of 
a network that still provide information about the structure of the network. In this study, 
prominence is operationalized as the scores on the first principal component of the relative triad 
censuses for all networks involved. Separate prominence indicators were generated for the 
economic, military, and political networks, as well as an overall global system prominence 
indicator. We validated these indicators by comparing them to other prominence or centrality 
measures. 
Past research has relied on a wide range of network-based indicators to operationalize the 
structural inequalities in the world-, global or international system. The earliest studies relied 
mainly on blockmodelling approaches that placed countries in distinct positions or roles (such as 
core, semiperiphery and periphery) (e.g., Nemeth and Smith, 1985; Smith and White, 1992; Snyder 
and Kick, 1979; Van Rossem, 1996). One drawback of such methods is that the boundaries of the 
blocks are always arbitrary to a certain degree and that they ignore the often substantial differences 
in power and importance of countries within a given block. For instance, both the US and 
Luxembourg may be core countries, but few would argue that they are equally important in the 
global system. The use of continuous prominence or centrality measures overcomes this problem 
(e.g., Lloyd et al., 2009; Mahutga, 2006; Kim, 2010). However, common prominence or centrality 
measures (degree, betweenness, eigenvalue), like the blockmodels, are network specific and do 
not allow for easy comparison between networks or over time. Furthermore, these prominence 
measures are not easily extended to multiplex networks in which countries are related through 
multiple ties. The advantage of the triad census-based prominence indicators compared to others 
is that they allow comparison over time because the indicators are standardized over the entire 
period studied and can readily be used on multiplex networks. We operationalized mobility as the 
change in economic system or global system prominence between two consecutive years. The 
evolution of unequal integration in the world-system, which can also be interpreted as unequal 
spread of status or prominence relations between countries in the system, was studied by analyzing 
the standard deviations of the prominence measures over time. 
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Globalization and Growth 
Globalization is operationalized using the KOF2 index, which offers countries’ degree of social, 
economic, and political globalization for every year since 1970 (see Dreher, 2006; Dreher, Gaston, 
& Martens, 2008; KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2015). These indexes combine indicators that 
measure the degree to which countries have been penetrated by (or their openness to) the world 
economy, polity, and society. In order to assess the overall intensity of globalization in the world 
in any given year, we aggregated the country-level scores to compute a global index of 
globalization. The economic globalization score was weighted by the GDP of the country, while 
the political and social globalization scores were weighted by population size. World economic 
growth was measured using the World Development Indicators’ annual real GDP growth variable 
(World Bank, 2011). 
 
Overall Inequality 
The results, presented in  
Figure 1 and Error! Reference source not found., confirm the stratified structure of the global 
system, with countries varying substantially in their level of global system prominence. The 
distribution of this global system is very skewed towards the higher end. The overwhelming 
majority of countries cluster around the lower end of the distribution, while only a few countries 
score towards the higher end. As the mean score on the global system prominence indicator for 
the period 1965-2005 equals 0 (with a SD = 1), the minimum score observed was -1.05 for Vanuatu 
in 1980, while the maximum score was 9.56 for the USA in 2004. The histograms in  
Figure 1 show a change in the distribution of the global prominence scores over time; a decline 
can be noted in the proportion of countries with the very lowest scores, where the proportion of 
those with slightly higher scores has risen. This is also confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests shown in Table 1.  
The distribution of the global system scores in 2005 was significantly different from that in 
1965. Note, however, that the most substantial change in this distribution took place in the earliest 
part of the period studied, between 1965 and 1975. No significant change was observed in any of 
the subsequent decades. In 1996, the top-10 countries were: 1) United Kingdom, 2) France, 3) 
United States, 4) German Federal republic, 5) Netherlands, 6) Italy, 7) Belgium, 8) Canada, 9) 
Japan, and 10) Denmark. In 2005, the top consisted of  1) United States, 2) Germany, 3) United 
Kingdom, 4) France, 5) Italy, 6) Netherlands, 7) China, 8) Belgium, 9) Singapore, and 10) Russia. 
Note that 7 of the 10 countries are the same in 2005 as in 1965.  
                                                                                                                                                             
2 KOF = “Konjunkturforschungsstelle”, which means business cycle research institute 
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Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Comparisons of System Prominence Indicators in 
Selected Years 
  Global system 
prominence 
Political system 
prominence 
Economic system 
prominence 
Military system 
prominence 
1965 1975 0.183** 0.253*** 0.557*** 0.161* 
 1985 0.177** 0.202** 0.588*** 0.192** 
 2005 0.220*** 0.263*** 0.631*** 0.272*** 
1975 1985 0.093 0.122 0.192** 0.149* 
1985 1995 0.077 0.135* 0.161** 0.247*** 
 2005 0.088 0.103 0.469*** 0.221*** 
1995 2005 0.109 0.123§ 0.443*** 0.066 
                         Significance: §: p < 0.100, *: p  < 0.050, **: p < 0.010, ***: p < 0.001 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Global System Prominence, 1965, 1985, & 2005 
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We attribute the finding that the UK and France are more prominent than the US early in the 
studied period to the importance of their (post)colonial networks. It is only in the second half of 
the studied timeframe that the importance of these networks decreases. Furthermore, several small, 
highly developed nations with an open economy and that value international relations, such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium, and more recently Singapore, also make it to the top. The bottom of the 
hierarchy mainly consists of dependent territories and small island nations. 
The BRICS countries were mainly in the sub-top of the distribution as early as 1965, with 
the USSR ranked 20th, India 22nd, Brazil 27th, South Africa 45th, and China 70th out of 176. China 
was still relatively isolated from the global system, following a self-reliance strategy towards 
development.  By 1985, however, China had climbed to the 18th position (out of 187), and by 2005, 
to place 7 (out of 212). The USSR (and later Russia) was also upwardly mobile, reaching a 9 th 
place in 1985 and a 10th in 2005, i.e., behind China. India’s position in the hierarchy changed little 
over time, taking place 33 in 1985 and 25 in 2005. Little changed for Brazil, as it rose to place 22 
in 1985, but dropped back to place 41 in 2005. The effectiveness of the international campaign 
against South Africa is demonstrated by the finding that by 1985 South Africa had dropped to a 
123rd place, only to become reintegrated in the global system after the end of the apartheid regime, 
climbing to place 33 in 2005. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Prominence Indicators (pooled over all years) 
 Global system 
prominence 
Political system 
prominence 
Economic system 
prominence 
Miltary system 
prominence 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
0
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0
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0
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Graphs by year
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Global system 
prominence 
1.000    
Political system 
prominence 
0.683 1.000   
Economic system 
prominence 
0.898 0.425 1.000  
Miltary system 
prominence 
0.872 0.373 0.740 1.000 
                            All correlations are significant at p < 0.001 
We conceptualize the global system is conceptualized as a multiplex network. Table 2 shows 
that the prominence in the three subnetworks, political, economic, and military, are all strongly 
correlated with the global system prominence; although, the correlation for political system 
prominence is somewhat lower than those for economic and military system prominence. Political 
system prominence also has only a medium-strength correlation with the prominence scores in the 
two other systems.  
This indicates that the political system follows a somewhat different logic than the others. 
Economic and military system prominence are more directly related to resources (either in terms 
of GDP or population), while for the political system these resources are considerably less 
important, allowing smaller or poorer nations to pursue political prominence. Nevertheless, the 
different prominence indicators evolved in a quite parallel fashion over time (see Error! 
Reference source not found.).  
The mean prominence increased at fairly constant pace from 1965 to 1980 and stagnated 
during the 1980s. A sharp drop in mean prominence is observed in the early 1990s, due to the 
dissolution of the USSR and the entry of former Soviet states in the system. The mean prominence 
scores—for the global as well as for the subsystem scores—increased again from the mid-1990s 
onward. Error! Reference source not found. illustrates, however, that the standard deviation 
increased over time alongside the mean prominence score, and that both follow similar patterns. 
Only the standard deviation for political system prominence remained fairly stable since the mid-
1970s. This implies that the inequality in the global system increased rather decreased over time 
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and certainly does not support the hypothesis that globalization will decrease the inequality in the 
global system. 
Both Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. further 
show that globalization increased steadily from 1970 to 2005 and is strongly correlated with both 
the mean score and the standard deviations for all prominence indicators (see Table 3). Only the 
correlation with mean economic system prominence is smaller. These results suggest that because 
it causes stronger integration amongst countries in the global system, globalization may raise 
countries’ overall level of prominence. Each country may be rendered somewhat more powerful 
in the global system; however, as certain countries benefit more from globalization than others, 
overall system inequality increases as well. Moreover, the partial correlations between 
globalization and the prominence indicators became non-significant after controlling for time. 
Accordingly, ongoing globalization and system prominence may well be two secular trends that 
might occur independently from each other.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Mean Prominence Scores (1965-2005) and Globalization (1970-2005) 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Standard Deviation of Prominence Scores (1965 - 2005) and 
Globalization (1970 - 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations between the globalization index and the system prominence 
indicators (N = 36) 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Global 0.864 0.703 
Political 0.820 0.696 
Economic 0.531 0.666 
Military 0.920 0.701 
All coefficients are significant at p < 0.001 
The Paths of the BRICS  
The BRICS are considered the up and coming countries. The results in Error! Reference source 
not found. only partially support this assertion.  
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Figure 4: Evolution of Global System Prominence Scores for the BRICS Countries 
 
China shows strong upward mobility from a global system prominence score of -0.23 in 1965 to 
one of 3.85 in 2005. This steady increase in prominence was already present from 1965, but from 
1998 on China’s global system prominence scores skyrocketed. The USSR and, later on, Russia 
also steadily increased in prominence from 0.27 in 1965 to 2.16 in 2005, with only a small dip in 
the early nineties after the collapse of the USSR (its global system prominence score dropped from 
1.47 in 1990 to 1.14 in 1992). For the other three countries, however, the picture is less optimistic. 
South Africa’s global system prominence score increased from -0.04 in 1965 to 0.93 in 2005, but 
for most of the period studied, its prominence declined because of the international boycott on the 
country, which caused it to score below -0.40 in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s. Only after the end of 
the apartheid regime, did its global system prominence start to increase again. Although Brazil and 
India also both experienced an increase in global system prominence, their gains were relatively 
modest. Brazil’s scores rose from 0.12 in 1965 to 0.62 in 2005, but had substantially higher scores 
in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s with a maximum score of 1.00 in 1987. Its global system prominence 
score kept declining throughout the 1990s, and only started rising again in the 2000s. India’s ascent 
is much more stable from 0.24 in 1996 to 1.14 in 2005, and it is only in the last few years of the 
period studied that its mobility appeared to increase. 
The evolution of the BRICS countries’ levels of prominence in the subsystems are somewhat 
different.   
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Figure 5. Evolution of Economic and Political System Prominence Scores for BRICS 
Countries 
 
 shows the BRICS’ evolution in terms of economic and political system prominence between 
1965 and 2005.  
 
Figure 5. Evolution of Economic and Political System Prominence Scores for BRICS 
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China’s increase in political system prominence was fairly gradual throughout the entire 
period, and its rise in economic system prominence was initially equally gradual. From the end of 
the ‘90s on it increased rapidly, making China a major economic power. From 1965 to the mid-
‘80s, the USSR/Russia’s political system prominence remained fairly stable. It was only with the 
introduction of the perestroika and glasnost policies that the USSR became a politicallyprominent 
player through its opening up to countries other than its traditional allies. Its increase in economic 
system prominence was fairly constant, except for a brief decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
South Africa was a political outcast for most of the period studied, and only attained intermediary 
levels of economic prominence.  
After 1994, South Africa really became a politically prominent country. In the economic 
system, however, South Africa’s intermediary levels of prominence remained fairly stable 
throughout the period. Thus, South Africa’s political integration in the global system was not 
accompanied by a similar economic integration. Both Brazil and India were already fairly 
prominent countries in the political subsystem, and their political system prominence only 
increased slightly throughout the period. Their economic system prominence remained at 
intermediary levels throughout the period, and this was especially the case for Brazil. India’s  
economic system prominence started to increase from the mid-1990s onward. 
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Globalization and Mobility 
The BRICS countries show quite different paths and rates of mobility. Only China is rapidly 
climbing up in the global system hierarchy, although Russia is also steadily improving its 
prominence. The others, however, display less impressive mobility. An even larger variation in 
mobility is observed among the other countries in the system, although the overwhelming majority 
displays increasing prominence scores over time and all declines in prominence tend to be limited. 
Of the 173 countries that have data for both 1965 and 2005, 140 or 81% show an increase in scores 
and only 33 decrease. The top risers over this period are 1) Germany (+5.62), 2) the United States 
(+5.53), 3) China (+4.08), 4) Italy (+3.70), 5) Singapore (+3.32), 6) the United Arab Emirates 
(+2.49), 7) Belgium (+2.47), 8) the Netherlands (+2.44), 9) South Korea (+2.37), and 10) France 
(+2.19). Among these ten most mobile countries, six were also already part of the ten most 
prominent countries in 1965. The four remaining countries are rapidly developing countries that 
followed export oriented growth strategies (e.g., Haggard, 1990). The top 10 decliners over this 
period were: 164) New Zealand (-0.16), 165) Western Samoa (-0.16), 166) French Polynesia (-
0.16), 167) Faroe Islands (-0.17), 168) American Samoa (-0.17), 169) Portugal (-0.17), 170) 
Greenland (-0.18), 171) Guadaloupe (-0.18), 172) Nauru (-0.19), and 173) Serbia/Yugoslavia (-
0.20). Note that the decline over this period is quite modest even for these countries, and that often 
they experienced considerable fluctuations in their prominence scores over this period. Many of 
the decliners are quite small nations, but this top 10 does also contain some industrialized nations.  
We ran a series of random-effects regressions to test whether or not some groups of countries 
benefit more than others from globalization and/or from the performance of the global economy. 
Table 4 shows the results for the random intercept regressions for change in global, economic, and 
political system prominence. Three models were estimated for each outcome variable: a base 
model (models 1, 4, & 7) with only the main effects of all predictors, a full model (2, 5, & 8) that 
also includes the interactions between system prominence and globalization and world economic 
growth, and a parsimonious model (3, 6, & 9) that contains only the effects significant at p < 5%. 
The results are very similar for global-system and economic prominence. A first question is 
whether or not globalization has an independent effect on mobility in the world-system, and 
whether or not this effect is more beneficial to more prominent countries. On average, more 
prominent countriesexperience higher economic and overall mobility (models 1 and 4), confirming 
claims that the core experiences mobility over time, rather than claims of especially strong 
semiperipheral mobility. The question remains of whether or not this mobility can be attributed to 
globalization. Globalization does not have a meaningful distinct effect on overall or economic 
mobility, providing evidence that becoming more intensely globalized cannot be considered an 
effective strategy for countries to achieve upward mobility. However, models 2, 3, 5 and 6 indicate 
that globalization provides a context in which certain countries can do better than others, and to a 
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certain extent, mobility (both overall and economic) depends on the degree of globalization. The 
interaction effects indicate that in periods of intermediate or high levels of globalization, more 
prominent countries experience higher overall and economic mobility than do less prominent 
countries. In periods of less intense globalization, by contrast, it is the less prominent countries 
that experience higher mobility. We must nuance these statements slightly with the finding that 
the effect of globalization is most conductive to upward economic mobility for countries in the 
sub-top of the spectrum, as indicated by the interaction term between globalization and the 
quadratic effect of economic system prominence (model 6). 
The world-system paradigm would expect that world-economic contraction would benefit 
upward mobility for countries in the semiperiphery, or middle of the hierarchical spectrum. Our 
results show that world economic growth does not have an independent meaningful effect on 
overall world-system mobility, but has a quite strong effect on overall (or average) economic 
system mobility (see models 1 & 4). In periods of high global economic growth, all countries tend 
to experience higher upward economic system mobility than they do in periods of low global 
economic growth. As was the case with globalization, world economic growth provides a context 
in which certain countries can experience more overall and economic mobility than others. The 
effect of system prominence on mobility only becomes negative in times of low global economic 
growth.  
 
Table 4: Random-Effects GLS Regression Results for Change in Global, Economic and 
Political System Prominence, 1970-2005. 
b 
(s.e.) 
Global system mobility Economic system mobility Political system mobility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant -0.0231 
(0.0512) 
-0.0399 
(0.0485) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0372 
(0.0534) 
0.0124 
(0.0507) 
-0.0161* 
(0.0067) 
-0.1104** 
(0.0333) 
-0.1159*** 
(0.0330) 
-0.1338*** 
(0.0308) 
Time          
Linear -0.0005 
(0.0008) 
-0.0008 
(0.0008) 
 0.0013 
(0.0008) 
0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
Quadratic 0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 
System prominence1           
Linear 0.0118** 
(0.0041) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0291) 
-0.1149*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0201*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.2087*** 
(0.0427) 
-0.2087*** 
(0.0453) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0213** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0162*** 
(0.0029) 
Quadratic -0.0024 
(0.0023) 
-0.0234 
(0.0173) 
 -0.0055 
(0.0028) 
0.0076 
(0.0246) 
 -0.0124*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0281** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0019) 
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Globalization 0.0008 
(0.0013) 
0.0013 
(0.0013) 
 -0.0014 
(0.0013) 
-0.0008 
(0.0013) 
 0.0034*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0035*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0008) 
World economic 
growth 
0.0011 
(0.0012) 
0.0014 
(0.0010) 
 0.0055** 
(0.0020) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0015 
(0.0008) 
-0.0013 
(0.0008) 
 
System prominence2          
Linear  0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
 0.0026*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
 
Quadratic  0.0004 
(0.0003) 
  -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
System prominence3            
Linear  0.0135*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0137*** 
(0.0022) 
 0.0321*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0320*** 
(0.0048) 
 0.0027*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0007) 
Quadratic  0.0003 
(0.0006) 
  -0.0002 
(0.0026) 
  0.0012 
(0.0010) 
 
R2 0.015*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
1 (t-1);  2Interaction (t -1)* globalization; 3Interaction (t -1)* world economic growth 
Thus, in periods of low economic growth, less prominent countries experience less reduction in 
their mobility than those more prominent do. However, as the interactions with the quadratic terms 
were not significant in either (global/economic prominence) model, we cannot confirm the world-
systems hypothesis that the semiperiphery especially benefits from world economic contraction. 
Finally, over all models, more prominent countries are much more sensitive to changes and 
fluctuations in the international environment (due to globalization and world economic growth) 
than less prominent countries. 
The story regarding political system mobility is somewhat different. Where, on average, the 
more prominent countries experienced the highest overall and economic mobility, it is the 
countries in the middle of the spectrum that experience the highest political mobility (see model 
7). On average, both the most and least prominent countries experience less political mobility than 
do those in the middle of the spectrum. Globalization has a distinct effect on upward mobility in 
the political system, though this was not the case for overall or economic mobility. On average, 
increased overall globalization is enabling all countries to gain in political prominence. Tough 
world economic growth did not have a significant main effect, more prominent countries tended 
to experience a somewhat higher political system mobility in years with high global economic 
growth than did less prominent countries. As discussed earlier, overall inequality is increasing on 
this dimension, too, as certain countries get left behind in the political integration process. 
However, this trend is much more modest than for the other dimensions. Overall, the trends 
discussed here indicate that the political dimension is evolving towards a relatively more equal 
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structure as the majority of non-core countries (especially from the semiperiphery) seem to be 
catching up to the prominence levels of the core. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
The BRICS countries are the most notable of a number of rising powers that aim to play a more 
influential role in international affairs. These countries advocate for a better integrated global 
regime that grants developing nations greater and more equal political recognition and economic 
opportunity. They have gained influence in regional and international organizations and, in some 
cases, have been able to significantly restructure existing ones or even create new regional 
institutions. The (alleged) rise of these countries on the global political, economic, and military 
scene has strongly contributed to the perception that the world is swiftly becoming multipolar, 
where almost equal amounts of power will have to be shared between the traditionally core 
countries and the rising powers. Moreover, scholars argue that the force underlying this rise, and 
thus, underlying change to the global structure of power relations, is globalization. This article 
tested whether or not the global power system has become more equal over the past few decades, 
and if this supposed change could be ascribed to the influence of globalization and the rise of a 
number of middle powers including the BRICS countries.  
The results presented here certainly do not support the contention that the global power 
system has become more equal over time. On the contrary, the scores for global system prominence 
have become more dispersed over the studied period, indicating that prominence inequalities in 
the global system or its subsystems have increased rather than decreased. This view must be 
nuanced, however, as the mean prominence score also increased over the studied period. This 
indicates that on average countries gained in prominence, and thus, in power, within the global 
system. That may be due to globalization, as increased integration of countries in the system 
creates denser networks. Moreover, as non-core countries start forming more relationships with 
other non-core nations, the core loses some of its broker or go-between function for non-core to 
non-core relations, thus causing hierarchy in the FIS to become increasingly undermined. This 
may point towards an evolution in which the structure of the global system is changing from a 
system where dominance is based on countries’ strategic location in the network of flows amongst 
countries to one where dominance relies more on the amount and strength of countries’ relations.  
Although there is considerable mobility in the global system, the position of the dominant 
countries does not seem to be immediately challenged. Countries that were prominent in 1965 are 
still quite prominent in 2005. However, this did not stop some new countries from rising to 
prominence. Of the BRICS, only China was able to gain prominence, while Russia had been a 
major power for decades. The other three BRICS countries all remained or became intermediate 
(or sub-top) powers. However, the attention paid to the BRICS may be excessive because China 
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was certainly not the only country to display substantial prominence gains. The focus tends to be 
on these countries because they are already regional powers and are often quite active on the 
international political scene. Moreover, they have an advantage of scale which allows them to 
sustain highly developed industries and regions. The real dynamic and upwardly-mobile countries 
that are increasingly rising to prominence seem to be smaller countries. 
Our results also confirm that the already prominent countries, i.e., those in the core, were the 
most mobile over this period. Thus, these countries were able to capitalize on their existing 
advantageous positions, further exacerbating overall inequality in the global system. Increased 
globalization benefits the more prominent countries more than less prominent ones in terms of 
upward mobility. This supports the world-system argument that globalization is not a 
transformative force, but reproduces and intensifies existing inequalities and power differences. 
Because of their location in the network of relations among countries, more prominent countries 
are better positioned to exploit the opportunities awarded to them by the globalization process. 
Though industrial production may be relocated to countries in the (semi-)periphery, the more 
profitable activities remain in the core, and those in the core also remain at the center of the global 
trade network despite increased trade among less prominent nations. The emergence of newly 
prominent countries in the global system does not threaten the existing structure of the global 
system therefore, as it may simply reflect a circulation of elites instead of actual structural change.  
Interestingly, globalization had a direct and positive effect on political prominence. The 
middle powers have benefitted from their increased integration in the global political system, 
which endows them with a greater degree of agency than would be expected purely based on their 
economic clout. These findings raise questions on the fungibility of power resources and thus, on 
countries’ ability to convert their political presence into more general global might. In any case, 
we must not overlook the fact that the perception that the world will be a different place in the 
future has contributed in no small way to certain countries being treated like rising powers. As the 
yearly BRICS summits and the establishment of the “New Development Bank” have made 
especially clear, this has been real in its consequences. 
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